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Introduction
Background
Cloud storage and computing provide a set of resources and
services through networks.
One approach with privacy-preserving computation is fully
homomorphic encryption (The Holy Grail of Cryptography).
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Introduction
Background
In 1978, Rivest et al. left an open problem of constructing a fully
homomorphic encryption scheme.
In the early researches, additive homomorphism [GM82, Pail99],
multiplicative homomorphism [RSA78, ElG84], additive
homomorphism and one-time multiplication [BGN05].
In 2009, Craig Gentry presented the first fully homomorphic
encryption scheme, which opens the curtain for the study of fully
homomorphic encryption.
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Introduction
FHE’s Current Research
So far, most FHE schemes satisfy IND-CPA secure.
Zhang et al.[ZPS12] present a CCA1 attack for the IND-CPA
secure fully homomorphic encryption [DGH+10] proposed in
EUROCRYPT 2010.
It is well-known that CCA security and the homomorphic
property cannot be achieved simultaneously.
In present, constructing CCA1 secure fully homomorphic
encryption scheme is still open.
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CCA Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Prabhakaran- Rosulek [PR08] proposed a new notion called
homomorphic CCA which only allows some specified
computations on encrypted data.
Boneh-Segev-Waters[BSW12] also proposed a similar concept:
targeted malleability.
Emura et al. [EHO+13] suggested a new primitive called
keyed-homomorphic encryption, where homomorphic ciphertext
manipulations are only possible to a party holding a devoted
evaluation key EK which, by itself, does not enable decryption.
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Keyed-Homomorphic PKE [EHO+13]
Main ideas:
Cramer-Shoup [CS02b] show that IND-CCA2 secure PKE and
IND-CCA1 secure PKE can be constructed by using universal-2
Hash Proof Systems (HPS) and universal-1 hash proof systems
respectively.
Emura et al. showµa trapdoor can degenerate universal-2 HPS to
homomorphic universal-1 HPS; In turn, universal-1 HPS can be
transformed into universal-2 HPS with the same trapdoor.
Based on the above specified uiversal-2 HPS, they proposed a
generic construction of keyed-HE.
In present, constructing HPS that supports additive
homomorphism and multiplicative homomorphism
simultaneously is still open. Emura et al.’s approach cannot be
employ to construct keyed FHE.
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Keyed-Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Setup(1k): outputs a decryption key DK and an evaluation key
EK.
Enc(PK, b): takes as input a public key PK and a message bit b.
It outputs a ciphertext C"
Dec(PK,DK,C): takes as input a public key PKßa decryption
key DK and a ciphertext C. It outputs a message bit b or ?.
Eval(PK,EK, ~CT, f )µtakes as input a public key PK, an
evaluation key EK, a tuple of ciphertexts ~CT and a Boolean
circuit f . It outputs a ciphertext C.
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Keyed FHE’s Security Model
CCA Security
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Double Encryption Methodology: First Attempt
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CHK Transformation: Second Attempt
The transformation of CHK generates different user’s ciphertext.
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Our Solution
We provide an approach to converting a ciphertext CT under any
identity ID into a ciphertext fCT under the designated identity eID.
For transformation correctness, we need be able to check
whether a ciphertext is well-formed. We resort to the recent
advances in indistinguishability obfuscation to overcome the
obstacle.
We define a new primitive named convertible identity-based fully
homomorphic encryption (cIBFHE).
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Our Construction: Main Idea
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cIBFHE: Definition and Security
cIBFHE = (Setup, Extract, GenerateTK, Encrypt, Transform,
Decrypt, Evaluate).
Two algorithms
GenerateTK(PP,MK, eID)! TK 7! eID for identity eID.
Transform(PP,TK7! eID, ID,CT)! fCT under identity eID.
Security
Setup: Send PP to the adversary A.
Query phase 1: A adaptively issues the following queries:
GetSKhIDi: C returns SKID  Extract(PP,MK, ID).
GetTKhIDi: C returns TK 7!ID  GenerateTK(PP,MK, ID) .
Challenge: C returns CT⇤  Encrypt(PP, ID⇤, b⇤).
Query phase 2
Guess
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Keyed FHE: General Construction
A cIBFHE and a signature S = (Gen,Sign,Vrfy).
Setup(1) : (PP,MK) cIBE.Setup(1), ( evk, esk) 
S.Gen(1), TK 7!evk  cIBE.GenerateTK(PP,MK, evk).
PK = PP, DK = MK, EK = ( evk, esk,TK 7!evk).
Enc(PK, b 2 {0, 1}) : It proceeds as follows.
1 Run S.Gen(1) to obtain a key pair (vk, sk).
2 Compute CT cIBE.Encrypt(PP, vk, b) and
   S.Sign(sk,CT) and output C = (vk,CT, ).
Dec(PK,DK,C) : S.Vrfy(vk,CT, ) = 1,
SKvk  cIBE.Extract(PP,MK,
vk),b cIBE.Decrypt(PP,SKvk,CT).
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Eval(PK,EK, ~C, f ) : For i = 1, . . . , k, it proceeds as follows.
1 Check whether S.Vrfy(vki,CTi, i) = 1. If not, it outputs ?.
2 Compute fCTi  cIBE.Transform(PP,TK 7!evk, vki,CTi).
Compute fCT cIBE.Evaluate(PP, evk, (fCT1, . . ., fCTk), f ),
 ˜  S.Sign(esk,CT) and outputs the ciphertext C = ( evk, fCT,  ˜).
Theorem
If the underlying convertible IBFHE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure,
and the signature scheme S is strongly EUF-CMA secure, then our
proposed keyed-FHE scheme is CCA-secure.
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cIBFHE’s Construction
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cIBE’s Construction
[ABB10] Adaptively-secure IBE
Ciphertext c0 = u>s+ x+ bb q2c 2 Zq,
c1 = F>IDs+
✓
y
R>IDy
◆
2 Z2mq
where FID = A | B0 +
P`
i=1 diBi, RID =
P`
i=1 diRi
cIBE
Property: To provide an approach to converting a ciphertext CT under
any identity ID from [ABB10] into a ciphertext fCT under the
designated identity eID.
Methods: iO and Puncturable PRFs.
Security: IND-sID-CPA secure based on LWE assumption.
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Indistinguishability Obfuscator (iO)
A uniform probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machine iO is called
an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class {C } 2N if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1 Correctness: For all security parameters   2 N, for all C 2 C ,
and for all input x, we have that
Pr[C0(x) = C(x) : C0  iO( ,C)] = 1.
2 Security: For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher D,
for all pairs of circuits C0,C1 2 C  such that C0(x) = C1(x) on
all inputs x the following distinguishing advantage is negligible:
AdvDiO,C0,C1( ) := |Pr[D(iO( ,C0)) = 1] Pr[D(iO( ,C1)) = 1]|.
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Puncturable PRFs
A puncturable pseudorandom function (PRF):
CorrectnessµFor every PPT algorithm which on input a security
parameter   outputs a set S ✓ {0, 1}n, for all x 2 {0, 1}n\S, we
have that
Pr[EvalF(K{S}, x) = F(K, x) : K  K,K{S} 
PunctureF(K, S)] = 1.
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Puncturable PRFs
Security: For any PPT algorithm A, the following distinguishing
advantage is negligible:
AdvAF ( ) := |Pr[A(S,K{S},F(K, S)) = 1 : S A( ),
K{S} PunctureF(K, S)] 
Pr[A(S,K{S},U¯`·|S|) = 1 : S A( ),
K{S} PunctureF(K, S)]|,
where F(K, S) denotes the concatenation of
F(K, x1), · · · ,F(K, xk), S = {x1, · · · , xk} is the enumeration of
the elements of S in lexicographic order, ¯`denotes the bit-length
of the output F(K, x), and U` denotes the uniform distribution
over ¯`bits.
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cIBE’s Construction
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Conclusion
We define a new primitive cIBFHE and its IND-ID-CPA and
IND-sID-CPA security.
We propose a generic paradigm of constructing CCA-secure
keyed-FHE by modifying CHK transformation slightly.
We construct a leveled cIBFHE scheme based on the
adaptively-secure IBE scheme [ABB10a].
Interesting Problems
How to construct a verifiable FHE.
Generic construction from identity based leveled FHE to identity
based pure FHE.
How to construct IND-CCA1 secure FHE.
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Theorem
If the (Zq, n,  ¯↵)-LWE assumptions holds, the proposed convertible
IBFHE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure.
Proof Sketch:
As for the IND-sID-CPA security of the convertible IBE scheme,
we follow the line of [ABB10], i.e., utilizing the partitioning
strategy.
We define a sequence of games where the first game is the
original IND-sID-CPA security game. Then we show that any
PPT adversary’s advantage in each game must be negligible
close of that of the previous game, and the adversary’s advantage
in the final game is zero.
Please see the full paper for the details.
